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 “Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful 
committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it’s the 
only thing that ever has.”1 
 What is a court really, but a group of thoughtful 
committed citizens? Yet when extending this philosophical 
sentiment to a supposedly apolitical, unbiased judiciary, 
does the adage somehow become tainted? Should judges be 
changing the world or simply maintaining and enforcing the 
status quo? This paper seeks to explore those two seemingly 
opposed perspectives through the real life prototypes of 
environmental law in India and the United States. This note 
will additionally conclude that the most effective and legally 
sound path to effectuate environmental protection is for the 
United States Judiciary to adopt the right to a clean 
environment as a fundamental one. 
With common British roots, India and the United 
States present a unique opportunity for comparison, 
especially in the field of environmental law. Both countries 
encompass a colossal amount of territory and support large 
populations. Yet they differ vastly in many respects, 
including the state of their environment and the resulting 
health and wellbeing of their citizens. This paper will 
address the evolution of each country’s environmental 
                                                
	
	
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Miami School of Law; B.S. 2012, 
University of Florida. Many thanks to Professor Williamson for his 
continued guidance on this endeavor and the University of Miami 
International and Comparative Law Review for their facilitation and 
review. Additionally, I would like to thank my family—Faye, Alan, 
Johnathon, and Josh—for their ongoing inspiration, support, and 
encouragement of my love of nature, law, and everything in between. 
1 Margaret Mead (1901-1978) An Anthropology of Human Freedom, THE 
INSTITUTE FOR INTERCULTURAL STUDIES (Nov. 19, 2015), 
http://www.interculturalstudies.org/Mead/biography.html. 
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policy within its court system and the societal changes that 
served as the catalyst for those advancements. The paper 
will focus specifically on judicial activism and the growth of 
environmental law in the common law system. It will further 
discuss why each country’s courts were able to take such 
radically different approaches and how the U.S. approach is 
in need of a substantial paradigm shift. 
Part I will provide some background on both 
countries’ environmental conditions and a foundational 
overview of the Indian governmental system. Part II will 
address the common law remedies to environmental harms 
that existed in both countries before the development of 
legislative remedies and the expansion of each country’s 
environmental movements. Part III will then discuss the 
catalyst that motivated each country to earnestly consider 
the environmental destruction and degradation occurring 
around it. Part IV will focus on the common law 
developments in the new era of judicial activism and social 
change in each country. Finally, Part V will focus on why the 
two countries had such divergent paths after the 1970s, and 
the pros, cons, and implications of each approach. The paper 
will conclude in Part VI with a recommendation for the U.S. 
Judiciary to adopt a new perspective. 
 
I. SETTING THE SCENE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
GOVERNMENTAL BACKDROP 
 
Due to a multitude of factors, environmental 
conditions in India and the United States are suffering. As of 
yet, the actions of both governments have been insufficient 
to reverse the trend of environmental degradation. In a 
218 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
survey of 178 countries’ environmental conditions, India 
ranked 155th.2 Today, India’s capital city, Delhi, is the most 
polluted city in the world.3 In a survey of the top twenty 
world economies, thirteen of the world’s twenty most 
polluted cities were in India.4 70 percent of the surface water 
in India is polluted,5 and smoke from cooking fires alone—
not even considering other types of air pollution—claims 
about one million lives every year.6 Poverty remains both a 
cause and consequence of resource degradation.7  
In comparison, the United States’ environmental 
conditions ranked 33rd out of 178 countries on the 
environmental performance index.8 Although this puts the 
U.S. in the top 20 percent for best environmental conditions 
worldwide, between 40 and 45 percent of all surface water in 
the U.S. is still polluted,9 and the aggregate of all types of air 
                                                
	
	
2 India, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX, YALE U., 
http://epi.yale.edu/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
3 Indian Winter, THE ECONOMIST, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21642172-narendra-modi-
should-learn-chinas-mistakes-its-too-late-indian-winter (last visited Feb. 
7, 2015). 
4 India: Green Growth – Overcoming Environment Challenges to Promote 




5  India-Environment, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/India-
ENVIRONMENT.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
6 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 3. 
7 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 4. 
8 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE INDEX, supra note 2. 
9 Patricia Hemminger, Water Pollution: Fresh Water, ENCYLOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/water_pollution.aspx#2 (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
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pollution in the U.S. causes 200,000 deaths annually.10 While 
these are not inspiring statistics, the environmental 
conditions in the U.S. seem pristine in comparison to the 
abysmal circumstances in India. 
Before conducting a comparison of the environmental 
laws that have impacted these sobering statistics in India 
and the United States, it is important to first note the 
similarities and differences in their legal systems and 
governmental structures. For the purposes of this note, I will 
focus on exploring the structure of India’s government and 
judiciary and assume the reader possesses a more in-depth 
understanding of the United States legal system. 
India’s common law system originated in the early 
1700s after the British East India Company first appeared in 
Indian Territory.11 The British quickly established their 
system of law in the three major cities now known as 
Chennai, Mumbai, and Kolkata.12 Almost fifty years later, in 
1772, the cities’ British court systems began to expand 
outward into the rest of the country and quickly replaced the 
old Mughal system that had been in place for over three 
centuries.13 
Over the next 200 years, the court systems continued 
to develop and change as the British Crown took control of 
                                                
	
	
10 Jennifer Chu, Air pollution causes 200,000 early deaths each year in the 
U.S., MIT NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://newsoffice.mit.edu/2013/study-
air-pollution-causes-200000-early-deaths-each-year-in-the-us-0829. 
11 Brief History of Law in India, THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA, 
http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/about/about-the-legal-
profession/legal-education-in-the-united-kingdom/ (last visited Jan. 5, 
2015). 
12 Id. These cities were known as Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta 
respectively. 
13 Id. 
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India.14 A segregated Indian Supreme Court developed, 
which excluded all legal professionals not of English, Irish, 
or Scottish origin.15 In 1950, India adopted its first national 
constitution16 with the goal of promoting social welfare by 
empowering even the weakest members of society.17 
However, the legal profession remained segregated until 
1986 when the profession of law was opened to all legal 
professionals regardless of race, nationality, or religion.18  
Today, under the Indian Constitution, the Indian 
government is structured somewhat similarly to that of the 
United States.19 Although India has a parliamentary system, 
it has  separate executive, legislative, and judicial branches.20 
The executive branch, similar to that of the U.S., is charged 
with the execution of India’s laws.21 The president, who is 
the head of state, ceremoniously heads this branch.22 
However, for practical purposes, the prime minister, who is 
head of government, leads the country with the assistance of 
his cabinet members.23 The legislative branch, on the other 
hand, has two primary houses of Parliament: the Rajya 
Sabha and the Lok Sabha.24 These Houses of Parliament elect 
the Prime Minister, who is then considered a member. The 









20 SOUMYAJIT MITRA, CORP COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA 
9:23 (Kochhar & Co. and Kenneth A. Cutshaw eds., 2014). 
21 THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA, supra note 11. 
22 MITRA, supra note 20. 
23 MITRA, supra note 20. 
24 Government of India, ELECTIONS.IN, 
http://www.elections.in/government/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
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executive and legislative branches, much like the U.S., are 
required to work closely with each other.25 Both the 
executive and legislative branches have limited powers, and 
the judiciary acts as a check on both branches.26 
The similarities between the U.S. judiciary and Indian 
judiciary are largely procedural. Similar to the U.S., a key 
role of the Indian judiciary is to interpret the Constitution so 
as to uphold the constitutional values that the framers 
envisioned and to safeguard the fundamental rights of 
individuals.27 While India’s Constitution originally 
envisioned a Supreme Court with one Chief Justice and 
seven other judges, the legislature has rapidly expanded that 
number to thirty judges.28 Interestingly, the proceedings in 
the Supreme Court of India are conducted solely in English, 
as mandated by the Indian Constitution.29 
II. COMMON LAW AND COMMON GROUND: A PRE-
LEGISLATIVE DISCUSSION 
 
With a basic understanding of the Indian 
governmental structure in mind, this paper proceeds by 
exploring the development of the environmental fields in 
both countries before diving into the current state of affairs 
in India and the United States. Exploring each country’s 
environmental background is central to fully appreciating 
the distinctions that exist today. The roots of environmental 




26 See id. 
27 MITRA, supra note 20.  
28 History, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/history.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
29 Id. 
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law in both India and the United States came in the form of 
public and private nuisance claims under common law.30 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a public nuisance as “an 
unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
general public, such as a condition dangerous to health, 
offensive to community moral standards, or unlawfully 
obstructing the public in the free use of public property.”31 
In India, this same principle was used to prevent the public 
health from being jeopardized by private businesses.32 
Nuisance claims remained an important remedy in both 
countries until the rapid development of codified anti-




The innate respect for environmental rights in India 
can be dated back to ancient religious scripture.33 The 
Arthashastra, a Sanskrit text dating back before 300 B.C., 
stated: “It [is] the dharma of each individual in society to 
protect Nature, so much so that people worshipped the 
objects of Nature.”34 Yet, it was not until 1905, in pre-
industrialized India, that the earliest reported case relating 
                                                
	
	
30 Josh Gellers, Righting Environmental Wrongs: Assessing the Role of Legal 
Systems In Redressing Environmental Grievances, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 
461, 478 (2011) (discussing common law remedies for environmental 
claims). 
31 Nuisance, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
32 Gellers, supra note 30, at 478. 
33 Id. at 477. 
34 Id. at 477-78 (citing Madan Lokur, Judge, Delhi High Court, IX Green 
Law Lecture at Convocation Ceremony of Centre for Environmental Law 
Students of WWF-India: Environmental Law: Its Development and 
Jurisprudence 1 (2006)). 
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to environmental pollution was heard.35  
In J.C. Galstaun v. Dunia Lal Seal, the Calcutta High 
Court of India sat in judgment of a shellac factory that was 
discharging liquid effluents into a municipal drain.36 The 
discharge ran through the drains and into the front yard of 
the plaintiff’s home, causing both a noxious smell and a 
health risk.37 Ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the court found 
that the defendant had no right to release its discharge into 
municipal drains and granted the plaintiff both injunctive 
relief and damages.38  
 
B. THE UNITED STATES 
 
In the United States, similar nuisance cases began 
arising in the context of environmental degradation. In 
Missouri v. Illinois,39 for example, the state of Missouri sued 
Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago for dumping raw 
sewage into a tributary that led to the Mississippi River and 
eventually to the city of St. Louis.40 Missouri claimed that, as 
a result of the untreated dumping, the water that flowed 
through the city was unfit to drink and had caused a 
                                                
	
	
35 Arpita Saha, Judicial Activism in Curbing the Problem of Public Nuisance 
on Environment 11 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished paper, National Law 
University, Jodhpur), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1439704. 
36 Govind Narayan Sinha, A Comparative Study of the Environmental Laws 
of India and the UK with Special Reference to Their Enforcement 170 (Aug. 
2003) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, University of Birmingham) (on 




39 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
40 Id. 
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substantial increase in disease, particularly typhoid fever.41 
Given the fact that there was no statutory authority for the 
claim, the Court entertained Missouri’s complaint on the 
grounds of public nuisance to the residents of the state of 
Missouri.42 The Court found, however, that Missouri was 
unable to sufficiently prove harm or causation.43 The case, 
nevertheless, illustrates the historical legal theory that was 
the bedrock in the U.S. common law system for claims of 
environmental degradation.44 
As common law nuisance began to be eclipsed by 
statutory law in the 1970s, both countries took a sharp 
detour away from their historical common law roots. In 
India, human rights came to the forefront following a rapid 
abandonment of fundamental rights. In the United States, 
citizens had the luxury of creating their own social 
movement based on both the intrinsic and the real value of 
environmental protection. At this point, the countries’ paths 
diverge. 
 
III. BIG BANG: THE CATALYST FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MOVEMENT 
 
A. INDIA: A STATE OF EMERGENCY 
 
The catalysts for human rights in India—and thus 
environmental rights—consisted of two major events in 
Indian history: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s issuance of a 
                                                
	
	
41 Id. at 499, 517. 
42 See id. at 518. 
43 Id. at 525–26. 
44 See also Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967); Madison v. Ducktown 
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904). 
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state of emergency, and, later, the Bhopal disaster. Indira 
Gandhi served as Prime Minister from 1966 to 1977.45 During 
her term, the Allahabad High Court found Gandhi guilty of 
dishonest election practices and misuse of public funds.46 
The turmoil accompanying this decision led Gandhi and the 
sitting President to declare a state of emergency for the 
entire country.47 
The Emergency period lasted from 1975 to 1977 and 
brought with it a wave of civil liberty restrictions and 
political changes.48 Among the liberties curtailed were 
freedom of press, restrictions on political opposition, and 
other fundamental rights.49 Meanwhile, the Indian 
government curbed the power of the Supreme Court to 
address these concerns.50 Through these amendments, 
Gandhi sought to bar review of elections, including her own, 
and stripped the courts of their power to review 
constitutional amendments.51 The 42nd Amendment further 
limited civil rights and placed restrictions on all lower courts 
and any opposition movements.52 
During the state of emergency, the Supreme Court 
largely acquiesced to Gandhi’s rule and the restrictions 
imposed on fundamental and human rights.53 After the 
                                                
	
	
45 See Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of 
Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases, 28 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 216, 243-45 (2010) (discussing the restriction of rights during the 
state of emergency in India). 




50 Mate, supra note 45, at 243. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 244. 
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emergency era ended however, the Court took it upon itself 
to repair the injuries that had been inflicted on the rights of 
Indian citizens.54 Their main strategy was to strengthen 
human rights protections and restore the fundamental rights 
that were in theory protected under the Constitution.55 The 
Court began by hearing cases of the crimes and abuses 
committed by those in power during the emergency 
regime.56 In addition, restrictions on the national media were 
lifted and coverage of the abuses of human rights and 
oppression of civil liberties began.57  
Just as the Indian people were beginning to recover 
from the emergency era, disaster shook the country. On the 
night of December 2, 1984, in the city of Bhopal, the Union 
Carbide chemical plant leaked toxic gas into the air over a 
heavily populated twenty-five square mile area.58 The 
resulting deaths and injuries made the tragedy one of the 
worst industrial disasters in history.59 Each responsible party 
shifted blame to another, and the ensuing litigation failed to 
provide any acceptable future deterrent.60 In an attempt to 
avoid another devastating environmental disaster, the 
government of India enacted major legislative reforms.61 The 
                                                
	
	
54 Gellers, supra note 30, at 478. 
55 Id. 
56 Mate, supra note 45, at 245. 
57 Id. 
58 Kathleen Crowe, Cleaning Up the Mess: Forum Non Conveniens and Civil 
Liability for Large-scale Transnational Environmental Disasters, 24 GEO. INT'L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 449, 453-54 (2012). 
59 Armin Rosencranz & Michael Jackson, The Delhi Pollution Case: The 
Supreme Court of India and the Limits of Judicial Power, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 223, 247-48 (2003). 
60 Crowe, supra note 58, at 454. 
61 Rozencranz & Jackson, supra note 59, at 248. 
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Indian parliament passed the Environmental Protection Act 
of 1986 and the Ministry of Environment and Forests was 
established.62  
Even though the government had taken some steps to 
remedy the problem, the magnitude and severity of both the 
Bhopal disaster and Emergency Era led the judiciary to take 
its own independent steps to remedy these injustices. These 
two changes, the Emergency Era and the Bhopal disaster, 
were the true catalysts for judicial activism and expansion of 
the standing doctrine that would soon become an integral 
part of environmental litigation and the health of the 
country as a whole.  
 
B. THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
 
While the Indian environmental movement and 
judicial activism were spurred by drastic political and 
environmental changes, the U.S. environmental movement 
was catalyzed by a social crusade that was much less 
politically charged. Many credit the true beginning of the 
environmental movement to the publishing and mass 
distribution of Rachel Carson’s 1962 novel Silent Spring.63 
The book discussed the ecological impacts of pesticides and 
the impending ecological disasters sure to plague mankind.64  
At the same time, the post-World War II climate 




63 David Walls, Environmental Movement, SONOMA STATE UNIVERSITY (last 
visited Nov. 9 2014), 
http://www.sonoma.edu/users/w/wallsd/environmental-
movement.shtml#mainContent. 
64 Claire Riegelman, Environmentalism: A Symbiotic Relationship Between A 
Social Movement and U.S. Law, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 522, 532 
(2009). 
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brought Americans increased income, a higher standard of 
living, and a shift from war to a focus on 
environmentalism.65 With more free time and money, people 
began to take advantage of the natural resources around 
them for their recreational and aesthetic value.66 The 
contribution of far more cars and highways simultaneously 
helped expand the number of National Park visits from 12 
million in 1946 to 282 million by 1979.67 Technology 
continued to expand with economic development, and the 
health of the land, animals, and people in the U.S. began to 
feel the impact.68 With the contemporaneously advancing 
levels of education, perceptions about the intrinsic and real 
value of the environment underwent a radical 
transformation, and a social movement was born.69 
The environmental movement began to put pressure 
on the government to implement national environmental 
laws and regulations.70 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
three prominent environmental groups formed, which still 
play a powerful and vital role in shaping environmental law 
today: The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the 
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural Resources 
Defense Fund.71 In conjunction with the larger 
environmental groups, public demonstrations, meetings, 
media reports, and petitions were all used to pressure 
lawmakers and the Executive to act.72 When laws were 
                                                
	
	
65 Walls, supra note 63. 
66 Riegelman, supra note 64 at 534. 
67 Walls, supra note 63. 
68 Riegelman, supra note 64, at 534. 
69 Walls, supra note 63. 
70 Riegelman, supra note 64, at 537. 
71 Id. at 534. 
72 Id. at 536. 
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eventually passed, the movement took to the courts to 
enforce and strengthen the progress that had been made.73 
This national social pressure helped lead an environmentally 
conservative judiciary to bend to the will of the whole and 
effect permanent change in the area of environmental law. 
 





The Indian court’s willingness to embrace judicial 
activism did not end with the Emergency Era. Since then, the 
Courts have continued to reinvent themselves, assuming the 
role of “the last resort of the oppressed and bewildered.”74 
One of their most powerful tools in advancing and 
facilitating the rights of the oppressed has been their display 
of activism through their liberal interpretation of locus 
standi—the Indian version of standing.75 Possibly the most 
important and significant difference between the Indian 
doctrine and that of the U.S. is that India’s is not grounded 
in the Constitution.76 Still, to warrant locus standi, Indian 
litigants must show both that their rights were violated and 
that the issue is capable of resolution through the judicial 
process.77 Because of this lack of constitutional grounding, 
                                                
	
	
73 Thomas M. Merrill, Foreword: Two Social Movements, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
331, 332 (1994). 
74 Rozencranz & Jackson, supra note 59, at 229-30. 
75 See id. 
76 Gellers, supra note 30, at 476. 
77 S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL'Y 29, 70 (2001). 
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Indian courts have been able to mold locus standi to more 
effectively achieve their goals. 
The first real activist role that the courts played was 
in restoring the judges who had been transferred from their 
positions during, and as a result of, Ghandi’s state of 
emergency.78 Rather than waiting for the judges themselves 
to bring suit, the Supreme Court, for the first time, allowed 
legal bar associations to bring suit on their behalf.79 
Bystanders could now file suit on behalf of the injured 
without suffering personal harm themselves.80 These 
decisions ushered in the beginning of a massive expansion 
not only of locus standi law, but also of judicial activism.81  
 The so-called Judges’ Transfer Case opened the door 
for a whole new type of standing jurisprudence best 
described as representative standing and citizen standing.82 
Representative standing allows for an individual to file suit 
on behalf of someone who cannot approach the court 
themselves for reasons of poverty, disability, inability, or 
social or economic disadvantage.83 The Court has extended 
this principle even further to allow an individual with 
sufficient interest to sue “in his own rights as a member of 
the citizenry to whom a public duty is owed.”84 Citizen 
                                                
	
	
78 Gellers, supra note 30, at 476-77. 
79 Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of 
Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 57, 58 (1994). 
80 Michael G. Faure & A.V. Raja, Effectiveness of Environmental Public 
Interest Litigation in India: Determining the Key Variables, 21 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 239, 249 (2010). 
81 See Gellers, supra note 30, at 476. 
82 Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme Court: 
A Study in the Light of American Experience, 29 J. OF THE INDIAN L. INST. 
494, 498-500 (1987). 
83 Id. at 499. 
84 Id. at 501. 
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standing allows individuals to bring claims that are so 
diffuse and commonly shared that no individual legal rights 
would otherwise be sufficiently infringed upon.85 Citizens 
no longer have to suffer a personal injury to bring a claim for 
something they feel aggrieved by. With the advent of these 
remarkably relaxed standing laws, citizens were able to 
challenge governmental actions in the “public interest,” and 
thus public interest litigation was born.86 
 The Court’s enabling of public interest litigation was 
no accident. As a way of redressing issues unsolved by the 
other two branches, the Court displayed patent judicial 
activism and sought to foster a trend. Reduced standing 
requirements, and the subsequent rapid growth of public 
interest litigation, had an especially strong impact on 
environmental protection. When governmental action or 
inaction threatened the environment, ordinary citizens could 
now bring suit on behalf of the general public, and the court 
pledged to be exceptionally receptive to the challenges. The 
environmental jurisprudence that has followed has 
continued to further expand the judicial activism that was 
first displayed by the Court in the Judges’ Transfer Cases. 
Along with considerable weakening of locus standi 
requirements, the Supreme Court of India also virtually 
eliminated the formalities and requirements involved in 
filing writs of certiorari.87 In 1987, it communicated this 
directive clearly in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India.88 The case 
                                                
	
	
85 Id. at 501. 
86 Faure & Raja, supra note 80, at 249. 
87 Bharat H. Desai, Enforcement of the Right to Environment Protection 
Through Public Interest Litigation in India, 33 INDIAN J. OF INT’L L. 27 (1993). 
88 See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE 
WORLDWIDE (Dec. 20, 1986), http://www.elaw.org/node/1322 (last 
visited Feb. 8 2015). 
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involved the aftermath of a gas leak at a food and fertilizer 
facility.89 Defendants objected to the suit on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs improper writ amendment should preclude 
their filing of a claim.90 The Court, however, stated that 
procedure was “merely a hand-maiden of justice” and 
should not stand in the way of the ordinary citizen’s access 
to the courts.91 
 
[W]here the poor and the disadvantaged are 
concerned who are barely eking out a 
miserable existence with their sweat and toil 
and who are victims of an exploited society 
without any access to justice, this Court will 
not insist on a regular writ petition and even a 
letter addressed by a public spirited individual 
or a social action group acting pro bono 
publico would suffice to ignite the jurisdiction 
of this Court.92 
 
The Court went on to hold that the letter requesting 
writ does not even need to be addressed to the Chief Justice 
or the Court in general, but can be addressed to any 
individual justice.93 The Court reasoned that “poor and 
disadvantaged person[s] or social action group[s]” may not 
be aware of the proper procedure or form of address.94 They 
may simply be aware of a judge from their state and a letter 







93 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE, supra note 88. 
94 Id. 
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to that judge would be wholly acceptable.95 Insisting 
otherwise would “deny access to justice to the deprived and 
vulnerable sections of the community.”96 Once again, the 
Court took a purely human rights based approach in their 
decision and in doing so, radically altered the law. 
In 1985, the Indian Supreme Court opined on what it 
proclaimed was the “first case of its kind in the country 
involving issues relating to environmental and ecological 
balance.”97 Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh was 
brought to stop the continued operation of limestone 
quarries in the Himalayan Mountains, which had been the 
source of considerable environmental degradation for a 
substantial amount of time.98 In ruling in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the Court relied heavily on the information it 
obtained from a self-appointed committee established to 
report on the quality of the quarries.99 
By appointing a committee at all, the Court 
proactively played an activist role before even deciding the 
case. In the opinion, the Court discusses the findings of its 
own committee before immediately discussing the findings 
of the Committee that “it seems the Government of India 
also appointed.”100 The Water Act gives the power to 
appoint committees not to the judiciary, but to the Central 
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and State Boards of the Department of Environment.101 To 
further emphasize this new sense of power, the Court went 
on to specifically direct the Department of Environment to 
form an additional committee and to “nominate,” within 
four weeks, specific individuals that the Court identified for 
continued evaluation of the ongoing mining operations.102  
The Court’s ruling proved to be a positive step for the 
Indian environmental movement, but was also a substantial 
overstepping of their established judicial boundaries.103 By 
acting on their own to appoint and prescribe committees, the 
Court cloaked itself in legislative power and, in doing so, 
began to foster animosity with the other branches of 
government.104 As the first real environmental case to reach 
the Indian Supreme Court, the judiciary set a precedent of 
environmental activism that would continue to expand in 
the coming years.  
In 1991, in Subhashkumar v. State of Biharm, the Indian 
Supreme Court reiterated another radical change in the area 
of environmental law.105 The case dealt with the discharge of 
waste sludge into the Bokaro River.106 While discussing the 
environmental harm, the Court referred to Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution, which states, “no person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
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procedure established by law.”107 Building on the 
longstanding acceptance that Article 21 embodied all 
fundamental rights, the Court then declared that Article 21 
“includes the right of enjoyment of pollution free water and 
air for full enjoyment of life.”108 In one short sentence, the 
Court made access to a clean environment a fundamental 
right. While the Court had previously touched on this idea, 
the clear declaration in this case proved crucial to the 
Court’s continued environmental activism.109 
Though brought to the courts as a public interest case, 
the suit failed on its merits because the Court determined 
that it was brought for the petitioner’s personal interest, 
rather than the public’s.110 The Court’s holding, however, 
exemplifies the human rights justification behind its new 
environmental jurisprudence. The Court would allow the 
extremely lax standing laws to legitimately promote the 
public interest, but restricted the use of the new lenient 
system for personal gain. 
In T. Ramakrishna Rao v. Hyderabad Urban Development, 
the Court took the environmental rights principle one step 
further by explicitly stating that, “[t]he slow poisoning of the 
atmosphere caused by the environmental pollution and 
spoliation should be regarded as amounting to [a] violation 
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”111 It is therefore 
“the legitimate duty of the Courts as the enforcing organs of 
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the constitutional objectives to forbid all actions of the State 
and the citizens from upsetting the ecological and 
environmental balance.”112 To pollute the environment is to 
violate the Indian Constitution and the fundamental rights 
of all Indian people. In addition to the existence of 
representative standing and relaxed locus standi, public 
interest warriors now have a definitive constitutional 
violation of a public fundamental right to allege as an injury 
in fact. 
After years of blatant judicial activism by the Indian 
courts, individuals who need to challenge a human rights or 
environmental violation in the public’s interest can now be 
represented by someone else, file a writ with a simple letter, 
challenge the degradation of nature as a violation of their 
constitutional rights, and rely on the courts to make a 
proactive decision for the betterment of the environment. 
The line between the law and moral righteousness has been 
bridged, but the true consequences of these decisions have 
yet to be seen. 
 
B. THE UNITED STATES 
 
In the U.S., judicial activism played a much subtler 
role in the development of environmental law. Prior to the 
environmental and social movements that came in the 
1970’s, the U.S. Supreme Court had previously acted 
primarily to slow environmental protections emanating from 
legislative bodies, and aimed to maintain its historically 
conservative role in environmental law.113 However, as the 
environmental movement grew, environmentalists began to 
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use the court system to enforce the laws passed by Congress, 
and the judiciary took on a more activist position.114 The 
courts started to support and help further the social and 
economic interests that had become an evident part of 
modern America.115 While legislation was a critical part of 
the movement, the courts played an important role in 
effectuating environmental protection through their 
interpretation of the law.116 Rather than producing opinions 
that narrowly construed or struck down legislative 
initiatives, the courts began to liberally construe legislation, 
and they “became open fora for groups seeking recognition 
of new rights going beyond what legislatures were prepared 
to grant.”117 The judiciary itself became an agent of social 
change.  
One of the most significant consequences of this 
judicial activism was the Supreme Court’s liberal expansion 
of legal standing requirements—especially as they apply to 
environmental rights. Environmental law and standing are 
intrinsically linked in the United States because standing 
laws often create substantial barriers for environmental 
litigation. As such, while the Court was sure to temper its 
displays of environmental activism, its expansions of the 
environmental standing doctrine was still one of its most 
prominent displays of that activism. 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution has been 
interpreted to require an individual to demonstrate that they 
have personally suffered an articulable injury that was 
caused by a defendant’s actions before the individual can 
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maintain a lawsuit.118 Furthermore, a ruling in that 
individual’s favor must have the potential to redress the 
specific injury that the person is facing.119 These principles 
have proven uniquely difficult to apply to environmental 
claims. 
In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 
Inc., the Supreme Court explained that “the relevant 
showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury 
to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”120 The 
standing doctrine, therefore, precludes any litigation on 
behalf of direct injury to a specific ecosystem that does not 
directly injure the individual plaintiff. This judicial 
interpretation of the standing doctrine “effectively removes 
ecosystems and other life from any direct claim to justice.”121 
This formulation of the standing doctrine requires that an 
ecosystem be utilized in some way by human beings before 
it can be protected from those same human beings—a 
valuation system that is often paradoxical. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 
demonstrated one of the most significant displays of 
environmental activism when the Court addressed the 
standing requirement of injury in fact.122 In the late 1960’s, 
Walt Disney sought to develop a ski resort in Mineral King 
Valley, a wilderness and recreation area directly adjacent to 
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Sequoia National Park.123 The Sierra Club challenged the 
development as a contravention of federal laws and 
regulations governing the preservation of national parks, 
forests, and game refuges.124 The Sierra Club claimed 
standing to challenge the actions as a “corporation with a 
special interest in the conservation and the sound 
maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests 
of the country.”125 Furthermore, the Sierra Club alleged it 
would suffer a direct injury as a result of the development of 
the valley because the development “would destroy or 
otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic 
objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the 
enjoyment of the park for future generations.”126 At this 
point, for the purposes of standing, non-economic injuries to 
widely shared interests had never been squarely addressed 
or recognized by the Court.127 
In addressing this issue, the Court chose to break new 
ground and articulated two important rules of law. First, it 
held that the aesthetic and environmental interests that the 
Sierra Club sought to protect sufficiently rose to the level of 
“injury in fact” adequate to lay the basis for standing under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.128 The fact that 
environmental interests are shared by many rather than just 
a few does not make them any less deserving of legal 
protection.129 Second, the Court held that the party seeking 
review must be among the class of people personally injured 
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by the action.130 “A mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter 
how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified 
the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not 
sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘adversely 
affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of the 
[Administrative Procedures Act].”131 As such, the Court held 
the Sierra Club lacked standing to challenge the 
development.132 Still, a personal aesthetic environmental 
interest alone—along with a showing that the plaintiff was 
directly injured in this way—was now considered sufficient 
injury under Article III of the Constitution. The novel step 
that the Court took in this case still remains relevant today. 
While the majority opined on what would become 
one of the most important environmental cases to date, the 
dissenting opinions similarly revealed their activist 
inclinations and laid important precedent for environmental 
scholars to come. A shining light in the case was Justice 
Douglas’ dissent, wherein he voiced a desire so often 
intoned by environmentalists across the country. 
 
The critical question of ‘standing' would be 
simplified and also put neatly in focus if we 
fashioned a federal rule that allowed 
environmental issues to be litigated . . .  in the 
name of the inanimate object about to be 
despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and 
bulldozers and where injury is the subject of 
public outrage. Contemporary public 
concern for protecting nature's ecological 
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equilibrium should lead to the conferral of 
standing upon environmental objects to sue for 
their own preservation.133 
 
With his now legendary dissent, Justice Douglas took 
a true activist role and urged the Court to “fashion” a new 
rule for environmental law. He even ventured so far as to 
urge the Court to base its decision on “contemporary public 
concern.”134 Despite his urging, the majority failed to find his 
reasoning compelling. Perhaps the transparent judicial 
activism that Justice Douglas displayed was too much too 
soon for the majority, whose opinion had already taken a 
novel departure from the stricter standing doctrine. Or 
perhaps the Court simply found Justice Douglas’s level of 
judicial activism to be unacceptable. Whatever the reason, 
the Court today has still never given life to Justice Douglas’s 
pioneering recommendation. However, over forty years 
later, his dissent continues to play an important role in the 
scholarly discussions of environmental law. 
In the years following Morton, the Court reversed 
course and again began to apply “reinvigorated and more 
restrictive” standing rules for cases dealing with 
environmental issues.135 As the Court noted in a 1992 case, 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, “when the plaintiff is not 
himself the object of the government action or inaction he 
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 
‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”136  
                                                
	
	
133 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741-42 (footnote omitted). 
134 Id. 
135 William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw: Standing and Citizen 
Enforcement, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 201, 215 (Richard J. Lazarus 
& Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).  
136 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
242 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
While the Court’s majority opinions continued to 
avoid liberal interpretations in environmental cases, the 
debate continued among the Justices over whether or not 
Congress has the power to confer standing for 
environmental cases where no cognizable direct injury to the 
person had occurred. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
Lujan found this type of congressional standing insufficient 
under Article III of the constitution.137 
 
The court held that the injury-in-fact 
requirement had been satisfied by 
congressional conferral upon all persons of an 
abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 
“right” to have the Executive observe the 
procedures required by law. We reject this 
view . . . . A plaintiff raising only a generally 
available grievance about government—
claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s 
interest in proper application of the 
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief 
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him 
than it does the public at large—does not state 
an Article III case or controversy.138  
 
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy, in his 
concurrence joined by Justice Souter, adopted a much more 
liberal perspective, opining that “Congress has the power to 
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will 
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed 
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before.”139 Justice Kennedy recognized the potential for 
statutes to define and provide for specific constitutionally 
cognizable injuries as a result of a statutory violation.140 
While he did not find the statute in this case sufficient, he 
expressed his willingness to find this type of conferral in 
other cases and opened the door for further expansion in the 
future.141 His rationale also provides a potential solution for 
conservationists seeking to get their environmental cases 
through the courthouse doors. 
While the Court followed Morton with almost a 
decade of stricter environmental standing, the Court in 2000 
retreated from these strict standards and embraced a new 
era of activism. The Supreme Court notably expanded the 
protections offered by the Court with its adaptive 
interpretation of both injury and redressability.142 What has 
still not changed, however, is that the relevant showing for 
Article III standing “is not injury to the environment but 
injury to the plaintiff.”143 
In 2007, the Court fostered its progressive position in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.144 In Massachusetts, the state challenged 
the EPA’s denial of a petition for rulemaking under the 
Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from 
motor vehicles.145 Massachusetts claimed that human-
emitted greenhouse gas emissions are a significant 
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contribution to global climate change and the resulting rise 
in sea level would lead to a significant loss in 
Massachusetts’s coastal property.146 
Quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Lujan, where he asserted that Congress “has the power to 
define injury and authorize chains of causation,” the Court 
found that the Clean Air Act authorizes this type of 
challenge to the EPA’s actions.147 It proceeded to address the 
issue of particularized injury and explicitly held that states 
are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal 
jurisdiction. In order for Massachusetts to protect its quasi-
sovereign interests, the state is entitled to “special solitude” 
in the standing analysis.148 Under the confines of this unique 
analysis, the Court found that the EPA’s failure to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions presented an injury to 
Massachusetts and its coastline that was both actual and 
imminent.149  
The Court surprisingly accepted a significant causal 
link in order to find injury in fact: The EPA’s failure to 
regulate a limited amount of greenhouse gases affected the 
global climate enough that it would result in a tangible rise 
in sea level that would erode the coastline and thereby injure 
Massachusetts. Furthermore, this was the first time the 
Court read a statute to find that Congress had implicitly 
authorized environmental standing. Despite these displays 
of activism, the Court softened its pro-environmental 
decision with the stipulation that states are “special 
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litigants” for the purpose of this environmental standing.150  
While Massachusetts v. EPA was certainly a victory for 
the environmental movement, it also illustrates the 
continued restraints—constitutional, political, and perhaps 
societal—within which the judiciary operates. Nonetheless, 
the Court’s activist role intermittently broke through these 
restraints and the Court left a lasting impression on the 
environmental movement. From its first step of recognizing 
the aesthetic value of nature, to its most recent steps of 
finding standing in statutes and validating attenuated 
environmental injuries, the Court has played an important 
role in the construction of environmental policy.  
 
V. THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 
 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
While both Indian courts and United States courts 
have taken an activist role in some sense through their 
environmental rulings, the courts in India have clearly taken 
their judicial activism far beyond that of U.S. courts. The U.S. 
Supreme Court certainly pushed the boundaries of 
established doctrine in cases like Sierra Club v. Morton151 and 
Massachusetts v. EPA,152 but the Indian Supreme Court 
formed an entirely new set of laws. This significant 
divergence in activism is partially attributable to the Indian 
Court’s interpretation of Article 21 as encompassing the 
fundamental right to a clean environment. By establishing 
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this principle in Subhashkumar v. State of Biharm153 and its 
progeny, the Indian Supreme Court hugely legitimized the 
power they were already acquiring and using. 
By recognizing the existence of such a right, the 
Indian Supreme Court’s environmental and human rights 
decisions now rely on constitutional interpretation, and the 
Court is simply enforcing the Constitution’s protection of 
fundamental rights.154 The Indian Supreme Court took the 
power to effect both environmental protection and harm 
definitively out of the hands of the legislature, and placed it 
soundly into the hands of the judiciary. As a result, the 
environment in India is now significantly more protected 
from the whims and changing power of the government, 
and is shielded from political corruption in the executive 
and legislative branches. With a stroke of genius, the Indian 
courts have claimed jurisdiction to decide environmental 
issues, even in the absence of statutory authority. The Indian 
courts picked up the ball where the legislature dropped it. 
While the strong activism in Indian courts is partially 
justified by Article 21, the courts still far exceeded the 
boundaries of their judicial power. For example, in 
Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Indian 
Supreme Court not only formed a fact-finding committee 
itself, but also went as far as to instruct the Department of 
Environment to form an additional committee and also 
inform the Department whom it was required to nominate. 
Even considering the added support of a constitutional 
provision, the Court largely exceeded its judicial limits by 
explicitly contradicting a relevant statute.  
In assuming this essentially legislative role, the Indian 
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courts today continue to protect the environment and its 
health. However, it is important to keep in mind that their 
ongoing efforts to increase environmental protections still 
remain relatively vulnerable to the changing climate of the 
courts. The judiciary is still a volatile and unelected branch 
of government. Environmental protections provided by the 
Court have the potential to be abused by an equally anti-
environmental judiciary in the future. Because the courts 
granted themselves so much discretion over the fate of the 
environment and because India’s environment teeters so 
close to the edge, an anti-environmental judiciary could have 
disastrous consequences for the people of India and the 
resources upon which they so heavily rely. The precarious 
state of India’s environment and the health and survival of 
its people would likely preclude a radical shift from this 
stance. However, an unelected judiciary can always change 
their minds regardless of the political climate. 
One reason the U.S. Supreme Court, in contrast, never 
made such drastic quasi-legislative moves is because it 
blatantly lacks a constitutional provision or legislative 
directive granting it that power. Not only does the U.S. 
Constitution fail to provide a positive right to environmental 
protection, but also Article III, as interpreted, actively 
inhibits the courts from significantly altering standing 
jurisprudence in favor of environmentalism. The mandates 
of injury, causation, and redressability must always be met. 
Yet, in order to meet the mandate of injury in fact, “the 
relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is 
not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”155 
This is in stark contrast to the Indian court’s interpretation of 
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, where “[t]he slow 
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poisoning of the atmosphere caused by environmental 
pollution and spoliation” is regarded as a direct 
constitutional violation in and of itself, regardless of whether 
the land is being actively utilized or not.156 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has regrettably failed to recognize the scientific fact 
that continued injury to the connected environment that we 
all share will inevitably result in injury to the health and 
wellbeing of all people. 
One potential solution to this Article III limitation 
would be for the Court and Congress to further develop 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan II. Theoretically, 
Congress has the “power to define injury and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or 
controversy where none existed before.”157 In Massachusetts 
v. EPA, the Court found that the Clean Air Act and 
Massachusetts’ status as a state confer “special solitude” on 
them for the purposes of standing.158 Congress could further 
this trend by defining certain environmental degradation as 
an injury in itself and thereby confer standing on individual 
citizens to seek redress for injury to the environment. 
Subsequently, the courts could expand on Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence and continue the trend that began in 
Massachusetts v. EPA. Consequently, the solution for 
environmentalists in the U.S. could lie with the legislature 
and the Court’s continued willingness to expand this notion. 
 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL NECESSITY 
 
Another possible explanation for the countries’ 
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diverging levels of activism is necessity. In India, the 
Emergency Era and the Bhopal disaster had already 
devastated the country when the judiciary took up its 
activist position. In a time of government corruption, 
massive imfringements on civil rights, and heartbreaking 
environmental disasters and conditions, the people of India 
were likely looking for the very solution that the Indian 
courts offered. The courts focused on rectifying the wrongs 
of the era and implementing civil and human rights, and 
when a significant legal requirement stood in the way, the 
courts felt entitled to eliminate it. While there was 
undoubtedly some opposition, the ineptitude and 
sordidness of the other branches of government prevented 
them from either resolving the problems or providing any 
kind of real opposition to the activist judiciary. 
 In the U.S. on the other hand, a social movement, 
rather than ecological or political necessity, spurred the 
court’s limited activism. The American people became more 
interested in outdoor recreation and developed the means 
and time to focus on that. While environmental 
organizations like the Sierra Club brought a multitude of 
suits to protect the environment, the U.S. still lacked the 
comparable pressure from the high level of environmental 
degradation that India continues to experience. As such, a 
high level of judicial activism was unacceptable from an 
unelected judiciary. Furthermore, because of the 
environmental social movement that was blossoming, the 
stronger legislative and executive branches of the U.S. 
embraced the movement and played their elected roles of 
furthering the crusade and developing and enforcing 
appropriate legislation. The combination of a more 
supportive government, a less devastated environment, and 
a contemporaneous movement towards increased civil and 
environmental rights insulated the judiciary against the 
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Another relevant factor for the diverging activism in 
the United States and India is the stark difference in their 
applicable environmental legislation. Since the late 1960’s, 
the U.S. has developed strong environmental laws that are, 
for the most part, enforced by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and other entities in the executive branch. 
In India, however, not only are the environmental statutes 
weaker, they are inherently self-limiting.159 Moreover, the 
applicable agencies fail to effectively enforce them.160  
India only has three environmental laws, and the last 
of the laws, the Environmental Protection Act, was passed in 
1986 to remedy the deficiencies in the first two Acts.161 Each 
state in India has a designated Pollution Control Board that 
is charged with the implementation and enforcement of the 
environmental statutes.162 However, the jurisdiction of each 
board is limited to “heavily polluted” areas.163 This 
precludes action by any Board for any degradation less than 
the “heavily polluted” standard and prohibits the 
development or implementation of any preventative 
measures. The Boards do not even have the authority to 
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prosecute polluters independently in ordinary courts.164 
This failure by the legislature to promulgate sufficient 
legislation to protect both India’s environment and its 
people has left a massive gap that needs to be filled. The lack 
of sufficient legislation coupled with the grave state of 
human rights and the environment in India may have 
justifiably spurred the courts to act in the way that they did. 
These factors may further explain why the Indian courts 
have continued to embrace and foster public interest 
litigation while the U.S. has resisted it.165 
 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF ACTIVISM 
  
The judicial activism in India and the United States 
has had a number of important implications in each country 
already and will continue to have far-reaching effects. The 
significantly weakened locus standi and writ requirements in 
India have led to a barrage of public interest cases entering 
the courts. In some of the Indian high courts, public interest 
cases have been known to take up to six years to make it 
through to completion.166 In order to deal with this 
onslaught of cases, the Indian government began requiring a 
monetary deposit for public interest cases that would be 
refunded if won, but forfeited if lost.167 Both the 
overwhelming time required and the financial obligations 
bring their own set of access to justice problems in India. 
 Furthermore, continued flagrant activism by the 
courts has bred distrust towards the system and the 
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government.168 Judges are not elected officials, yet they are 
effectively legislating as if they were. With conflicting laws 
and procedures, even the most educated of citizens may fail 
to grasp which precedent is binding. Moreover, the courts 
are not in the position to balance the need for environmental 
protection and human rights with the need for economic 
development and growth.169 
It is lamentably ironic that the Indian Supreme Court, 
by trying to fix the errors made by the Ghandi 
administration, is actually breeding more distrust and 
animosity between the government and its people, and 
within the different branches of government. The courts are 
fighting human degradation with a governmental power 
grab. For the time being, the courts are coming down with 
decisions in favor of both the environment and human 
rights, but the long-term consequences of their actions and 
activism may prove to be less than helpful. Until then, 
India’s judicial activism will hopefully have a profoundly 
positive effect on India’s environment and living conditions. 
On the other hand, in the U.S., the much slower 
change and milder judicial activism has mostly avoided 
provoking distrust from the other branches of government 
and the U.S. people. The U.S. courts have taken much less of 
a pro-environment and pro-human rights position in their 
opinions, but they have also been lacking the same 
environmental and human rights pressure to do so. 
Significantly more proficient legislation has spared the 
courts from having to take a highly activist role. Stability, a 
lack of recent political turmoil, and a nearly 250-year-old 
Constitution have resulted in a more consistent government, 
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and provided courts the luxury of generally maintaining the 
status quo. The limited activism that the courts chose to 
deliver has proven relatively helpful for the environmental 
movement and was accomplished without causing any 
major governmental instability. Courts were able to lean on 
strong legislation and the knowledge that that legislation 
would be enforced. In the long run, the slower move of U.S. 
courts to facilitate environmental protection certainly 
provides the least turmoil. But at the same time, will it ever 
sufficiently embrace the true value of the environment or 
acknowledge its interconnectedness? With a rapidly 
changing climate, and limited time to reverse the trend, this 
halfhearted attitude towards a life-sustaining resource may 
prove to be our downfall. 
 
VI. A PROPOSITION 
  
While the Indian system and judicial activism are 
shadowed by corruption and mass poverty, India’s 
environmental jurisprudence intuitively has its 
advantages—particularly in the area of standing. The U.S. 
system has arbitrarily drawn a line to determine when an 
individual is “injured enough” to be able to assert their right 
to live in a healthy environment. This is inherently the 
wrong way of viewing the problem. A working environment 
is among the most basic and fundamental rights that we 
possess as living beings. We cannot eat, we cannot breathe, 
and hence, we cannot survive without an environment 
functioning well enough to support our basic needs. The 
U.S. Constitution provides that we shall not be deprived of 
“life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness, without due 
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process of law,”170 yet smog, dirty water, and a lack of 
resources have the potential to dramatically shorten the 
length of lives. Is that not deprivation of life in one of its 
simplest forms? The Indian Supreme Court seems to think 
so, and the United States should follow suit.  
 Furthermore, the line-drawing problem becomes even 
more complicated in the context of environmental laws 
because we are dealing with the global climate. 
Environmental changes all across the world—not just in our 
backyard—affect the health of our environment at home. 
Deforestation in Alaska affects the clean air in Florida, just as 
the rerouting of surface water from the Everglades affects 
the quality of water in Miami. In an area so inherently 
adverse to drawing lines, the courts should not turn a blind 
eye to this interconnectedness when deciding who is injured 
and who is not. The Court cannot determine how many trees 
must be cut down across the country before the dirty air we 
breath, as a result of that, shortens life spans. Proximity to 
those trees should not be the determinative factor in 
deciding whether enough injury exists to justify litigation. It 
is time to give life to Justice Douglas’ Morton dissent, and 
“protect[] nature’s ecological equilibrium”  for the health of 
all.171 
Because the direct injury requirement can preclude a 
case from ever being decided on legitimate merits—such as 
the impact on global climate change—the courts should 
follow the example set by India and relax the standing laws 
when it comes to environmental rights. Judicial activism 
does not always have to take as extreme a form as that of 
India. The U.S. can learn a valuable lesson from India’s 
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constitutional valuation of environmental protection without 
committing to the same path of extreme activism and 
political instability. The United States should, and can, 
simply recognize the right to a clean environment as a 
fundamental one and help protect all life on earth now and 
in the future. This change would not require an 
abandonment of the standing doctrine. It would simply be 
an acknowledgement by the courts that environmental 
degradation injures everyone. After all, what could be a 
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